The Sending-or-Not-Sending protocol of the twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has its advantage of unconditional security proof under any coherent attack and fault tolerance to large misalignment error. So far this is the only coherent-state based TF-QKD protocol that has considered finite-key effect, the statistical fluctuations. Here we consider the complete finite-key effects for the protocol and we show by numerical simulation that the protocol with typical finite number of pulses in practice can produce unconditional secure final key under general attack, including all coherent attacks. It can exceed the secure distance of 500 km in typical finite number of pulses in practice even with a large misalignment error such as 20%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) could provide an unconditionally secure communication method [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] of two parties, Alice and Bob. But the security in ideal case [5] [6] [7] [8] dose not guarantee the security in practice [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Fortunately, the decoy-state method could help us beating the photon-number-split (PNS) attack [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] and guarantee the security with imperfect light sources. Besides decoy-state mehtod, there are other protocols such as RRDPS protocol [41, 42] proposed to beat PNS attack. Measurement-device-independent (MDI)-QKD [43, 44] can solve all possible loopholes of detection. And the decoy-state MDI-QKD [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] protocol could help us ensure the security of protocol performed by imperfect light sources and detectors.
The 4-intensity protocol [57] together with the jointconstraints [56] has greatly improved the key rate and distance of the MDI-QKD. Using this protocol, a distance exceeding 400 km has been experimentally demonstrated [52] for the MDI-QKD. However, the key rate of all the prior art decoy-state protocols and the MDI-QKD protocols protocols cannot be better than the linear scale of channel transmittance. It cannot exceed the known bound of the repeaterless QKD, such as the PLOB bound [59] or the TGW bound [60] . Recently, a QKD protocol named Twin-Field (TF) QKD was proposed [61] whose key rate R ∼ O( √ η), where η is the channel transmittance, and thus have attracted much attention. But the later announcement of the phase information in Ref [61] will casuse security loopholes [62, 63] , and many variants of TF QKD have been proposed [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] to close the loophole. A series of experiments [70] [71] [72] [73] have been done to demonstrate those protocols. In particular, an efficient protocol for TF-QKD through sending-or-notsending (SNS protocol) has been given in Ref. [63] . The SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in proof-of-principle in Ref. [70] , and realized in real optical fiber with the effects of statistical fluctuation being taken [71] . The unconditional security of SNS protocol in the asymptotic case have been proved [63] and SNS protocol relaxes the requirement for single photon interference accuracy. The key rate of SNS is still considerable even if the misalignment error is as large as 35%. Among all those variants of TF QKD with coherent states, the SNS QKD protocol is the only one that takes the effect of statistical fluctuation and finite decoy states into consideration [68] . Here we show an analysis of the complete effect of finite-key size of SNS QKD protocol.
The main tool we use to analyse the effect of finitekey size is the universally composable framework [74] . An complete QKD protocol usually includes the preparation and distribution of quantum states, measurement of received quantum states, parameter estimation, error correction and private amplification. After the error correction step, Alice gets a bit string S, and Bob get an estimate string S ′ of S. If the error rate is too large, the results of error correction is an empty string and the protocol aborts. A protocol is called ε cor -correct if the probability that S and S ′ aren't the same, Pr(S = S ′ ) ≤ ε cor .
Besides, the quantum state of Alice may be attacked by Eve in the distribution and measurement step and some information would be leaked to Eve. To ensure the security of final secret keys, Alice and Bob apply a privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing [75] to extract two shorter strings of length l from S and S ′ . We denote the density operator of the system of Alice and Eve as ρ AE . If
where U A denotes the fully mixed state of Alice's system of strings of length l, the protocol is called ε secsecret [54, 76, 77] . According to the composable framework, a protocol is called ε-secure if it is both ε cor -correct and ε sec -secret, and ε ≤ ε cor + ε sec . This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. II, we introduce the main results of the effect of finite-key size. And in Sec. III, we present our numerical simulation results. The article ends with some concluding remarks. The details of calculation are shown in the Methods part.
II. THE EFFECT OF FINITE-KEY SIZE OF SNS PROTOCOL
Here we consider the four-intensity decoy state SNS protocol [68] . In this protocol, Alice and Bob randomly send vacuum state or weak coherent pulse state to the third party, Charlie. In each time, Alice and Bob randomly choose X window or Z window with probabilities 1 − p z and p z . If X window is chosen, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses vacuum state |0 , |e iδA+iγA α or |e
with probabilities p 0 , p 1 and 1 − p 0 − p 1 respectively, where α 2 = µ 1 and α ′2 = µ 2 are the intensities of different decoy sources, and γ is the public phase and δ is random in [0, 2π) which will be announced in the parameter estimation step. If Z window is chosen, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses vacuum state |0 , or phase-randomized weak coherent state |α Z with probabilities p z0 and 1 − p z0 , where α 2 z = µ z is the intensity of signal source. Then Alice and Bob prepare the chosen state and send it to Charlie. Charlie is assumed to perform interferometric measurements on the received quantum signals and announces the measurement result to Alice and Bob. If one and only one detector clicks in the measurement process, Charlie will also announces whether the left detector or right detector clicks. And Alice and Bob will take it as an effective event. Other events will be discarded. The whole protocol is as follows. 1. State preparation and distribution. Alice and Bob repeat the above steps for i = 1, 2, · · · , N times. In each time i, Alice and Bob randomly choose a vacuum state or weak coherent pulse state according to their corresponding probabilities. And then Alice and Bob prepare such a state and send it to Charlie through quantum channel. 2. Measurement. Charlie is assumed to perform interferometric measurements on the received quantum signals and announces the measurement result to Alice and Bob through public channel. If one and only one detector responds in the measurement process, Charlie will also announces whether the left detector or right detector responds, and Alice and Bob will take it as an effective event. 3. Sifting. Alice and Bob announce whether the signals of effective events are prepared in X window or Z window. Then Alice and Bob divide all the effective events into two sets, X and Z accordingly, where set Z only contains the effective events that both Alice and Bob prepare the quantum signals in Z window and set X contains all other effective events. Then Alice and Bob announce all information of their prepared states, including the intensities and phases, of the effective events of set X . 4. Parameter estimation. For the events in set Z, Alice will denote it as bit 0 if she sends a vacuum state, and denote it as bit 1 if she sends a phased-randomized weak coherent state. In the same time, Bob will denote it as bit 1 if he sends a vacuum state, and denote it as bit 0 if he sends a phased-randomized weak coherent state. Finally Alice and Bob form the n t bits strings Z s and Z . To achieve this goal, Alice sends Bob leak EC bits of error correction data. Then Alice computes a hash of Z s of length log(1/ε cor ) using a random universal hash function, and she sends the hash and hash function to Bob [75] . If the hash of Bob computes is the same with Alice, the probability that Z s and Z s aren't the same, Pr(Z s =Ẑ s ), is less than ε cor . If the hash of Bob computes is not the same with Alice, the protocol aborts. 6. Private amplification. Alice and Bob apply a privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing [75] to extract two shorter strings of length l from Z s andẐ s . Alice and Bob obtain strings S andŜ which is the final secret key after privacy amplification.
The protocol is ε cor -correct if the error correction step is passed. If the final length of secret keys, l, satisfies
the protocol is ε sec -secret. And according to the composable framework, the security coefficient of the whole protocol is ε tol = ε cor +ε sec , where
is the binary Shannon entropy function. Here, ε cor is the failure probability of error correction;ε is the accuracy of estimating the smooth min-entropy, which is also the failure probability that the real value of e ph 1 isn't in the bound that we estimate; ε P A is the failure probability of privacy amplification; ε n1 is the failure probability that the real value of n 1 isn't in the bound that we estimate. The value of leak EC is related to the specific error correction schemes, and in general leak EC = f n t h(E z ), where f is the error correction inefficiency and E z is the error rate of strings Z s and Z ′ s .
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
If an experiment of SNS protocol is done, we can first calculate the lower and upper bound of S jk with Eqs. (10), (14)- (18) We use the linear model to simulate the observed values of experiment with the experimental parameters list in Table. I. Without loss of generality, we assume the distance between Alice and Charlie and the distance between Bob and Charlie are the same, and we assume the property of Charlie's two detectors are the same. If the total transmittance of the experiment set-ups is η = 10 −L/100 η d , where L is the distance between Alice and Bob. The simulation of those observed values are shown in Sec. IV C, which are related to η and other parameters list in Table. I.
Here we set ε cor =ε = ε P A = ξ,ε = 4ξ and ε n1 = 4ξ, and thus security coefficient of the whole protocol is ε tol = 24ξ = 2.4 × 10 −9 . The reason we setε = 4ξ and ε n1 = 4ξ is we use the Chernoff bound for four times to estimate e ph 1 and n 1 (Notice that we could handle S 01 + S 10 together and we could handle S 02 + S 20 together in Eq. (10)). In order to fairly compare the performance of generating final keys of different total pulse numbers, N , we define the key rate of per sending pulse, R = l/N . work and Ref. [68] with the experimental parameters list in Table. I. The only difference of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is that e d = 15% of Fig. 1 and e d = 20% of Fig. 2 . The results of this work and Ref. [68] is almost overlap while we set N = 1 × 10
14 , but the difference of the results is obvious while we set N = 1 × 10 10 , especially in the end of the lines. Still, the secure distance of SNS protocol can still reach up to 500 km with 20% misalignment error and 1 × 10 12 total pulses, even if we take all the effects of finite-key size into consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show an analysis of the finite-key size effect of SNS protocol and get the relation of final key length l and the security coefficient, as shown in Eq. (2). Eq. (2) is derived by the method proposed in Ref. [77] , and thus it can produce unconditional secure final key under general attack, including all coherent attacks. The numerical results show that the secure distance of SNS protocol can still reach up to 500 km with 20% misalignment error and 1 × 10 12 total pulses, even if we take all the effects of finite-key size into consideration. This clearly shows that the SNS protocol [63] of TF-QKD is on the one hand secure under general attack, i.e., as secure as the existing decoy-state MDI-QKD, on the other hand more efficient than the existing decoy-state MDI-QKD by many orders of magnitudes in key rate at long distance domain.
Acknowledgement: We thank Hai Xu for discussions. We acknowledge the financial support in part by In this protocol, any attack to quantum channel and detectors is allowed only if it doesn't break the rules of quantum mechanics, and we call the attacker as Eve. We denote the system of Eve after error correction as E ′ . If Alice and Bob apply a privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing to extract two shorter strings of length l from Z s , the protocol is ε sec -secret [75, 78] 
where H ε min (Z s |E ′ ) is the ε-smooth min entropy. It measures the max probability of guessing Z s right giving E ′ . E ′ could be decomposed as CE, where C is the system of leakage information while Alice and Bob perform error correction and E is the system of Eve before error correction. According to the chain rules [75] , we have
where |C| < leak EC + log 2 ( 2 εcor ). And we could decompose the string Z s as Z 1 Z rest , where Z 1 is the bits caused by single-photons and Z rest is the other bits of Z s [54] . Thus according to the chain rules [79] , we have
where ε = 2ε + ε ′ +ε and H ε ′ min (Z rest |E) ≥ 0. To get the lower bound of Hε min (Z 1 |Z rest E), we need to use the uncertainty relation of smooth min and max entropy [77, 80] . It says that if the single-photon states prepared in X basis and Z basis are orthogonal unbiased, and if the states originally measured under the Z-basis are now measured under the X-basis and obtained strings X 1 and X ′ 1 by Alice and Bob respectively, then we have
. (6) Finally we have
Combining Eqs. (2), (3) and (7) and setting ε ′ = 0, we have
Finally, containing the failure probability that the real value of n 1 isn't in the bound that we estimate, ε n1 , we have
B. The calculation method of n1 and e
The method we use here is similar with Ref. [68] . To introduce our calculation method clearly, we denote
It is easy to check that the density operator of |e iδA+iγA α and |e
Alice chooses δ A and δ ′ A randomly, is ρ 1 and ρ 2 . And this also apply to Bob's quantum state. In the whole protocol, Alice and Bob obtain N jk (j, k = 0, 1, 2, z) instances when Alice sends state ρ j and Bob sends state ρ k . And after the sifted step, Alice and Bob obtain n jk effective events. We denote the counting rate of source jk as S jk = n jk /N jk . The sending or not sending information of set Z is not announced, and thus we don't know the value of n 0z , n z0 and n zz . But the number of total effective events of set Z, n t , and other n jk are known values. With all those definitions, we have
Besides, we need define two new sets C ∆ + and C ∆ − . C ∆ + contains all the instance that both Alice and Bob prepare |e iδA+iγA α and |e iδB +iγB α and |δ A − δ B | ≤ ∆. C ∆ − contains all the instance that both Alice and Bob prepare |e iδA+iγA α and |e iδB +iγB α and |δ A − δ B − π| ≤ ∆. The number of instances in C ∆ ± is
We denote the number of effective events of right detectors responding from C ∆ + as n R ∆ + , and the number of effective events of left detectors responding from C ∆ − as n L ∆ − . And we get the counting error rate of C ∆ ± ,
If we denote the expected value of the counting rate of single-photon state, 
where S jk is the expected value of S jk , and S jk and S jk are the upper bound and lower bound of S jk when we estimate the expected value from its observed value. The expected value of the phase-flip error rate of the single-photons in the Z basis satisfies [68] 
Here we use the fact that the error rate of vacuum state is always [58, 81] . Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be n random samples, detected with the value 1 or 0, and let X denote their sum satisfying X = n i=1 X i . φ is the expected value of X. We have
where we can obtain the values of δ 1 (X) and δ 2 (X) by solving the following equations
(1 − δ 2 ) 1−δ2
where ξ is the failure probability. Thus we have
Still Eqs. (12) and (13) (14)- (17), the observed value, ϕ, and its expected value, Y , satisfy
where we can obtain the values of δ (
We define N 1 = 2p z p z0 (1 − p pz0 )µ z e −µz N , and we have [68] 
This ends the estimate of n 1 and e ph 1 .
C. The simulation of observed values
We use the linear model to simulate the observed values of experiment with the experimental parameters list in Table. I. Without loss of generality, we assume the distance between Alice and Charlie and the distance between Bob and Charlie are the same, and we assume the property of Charlie's two detectors are the same. If the total transmittance of the experiment set-ups is η, then we have n t = n signal + n error , E z = n error n t ,
where N 00 , N 01 , N 10 , N 02 , N 20 , N ∆ ± are defined in Eqs. (10) and (11) and
where I 0 (x) is the 0-order hyperbolic Bessel functions of the first kind.
